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Ethical Issues Arising From the Investigation of
Activities of Intellectual Property Infringers
Represented by Counsel
Phillip Barengolts∗
¶1

¶2

In disputes involving the violation of intellectual property rights, it is common
practice to investigate the alleged infringer’s activities either after demanding that the
infringer cease and desist or after commencement of a lawsuit.1 Intellectual property
owners want to know whether infringing activities continue after action is initiated,
whether court orders are being obeyed and whether infringing activities have changed in
quantity or quality. While most attorneys hire private investigators to perform such
services without a thought to their propriety, some recent decisions have shed light on
this practice with respect to Rule 4.2 of the 2002 ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (the “Model Rules”) and similar rules promulgated in most jurisdictions.2
This article will describe how the rules of ethics have been understood by the
courts to allow investigative activities (limited to contact that mimics the represented
party’s transactions with consumers) in the context of intellectual property rights
enforcement when this enforcement involves contact with a represented party. Section I
describes the applicable Rules, as stated in the Model Rules. Section II discusses
decisions that have addressed the issue. Section III addresses the ABA’s guidance on the
issue. Finally, Section IV attempts to show that the previously discussed authorities are
in harmony with the purposes of the anti-contact rule and delineates proper conduct under
the Rules.
I.

THE RULES

A.
¶3

RULE 4.2

Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject
of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by

∗
J.D. 2001, Harvard University Law School. Attorney in the law firm of Pattishall, McAuliffe,
Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson.
1
The ethics of ex parte contacts with employees of an organization is a broad subject. This article is
limited to an analysis of such contacts in the context of intellectual property litigation.
2
For purposes of this article, it will be assumed that all jurisdictions apply the Model Rule, or a rule
substantially similar to the Model Rule. Of course, to properly evaluate one’s ethical obligations, it is
necessary to check the particular rule applicable in the jurisdiction at issue.
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another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.3
¶4

Comment 7 to Rule 4.2 states:
In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits
communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises,
directs or regularly consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning the
matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the
matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be
imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.4
B.

¶5

RULE 8.4

Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules in pertinent part states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;. . . [and] (c) engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. . .5

¶6

¶7

The plain language of the Rules suggests that it is professional misconduct for an
attorney to elicit an admission from an employee of an organization by sending an
investigator posing as a customer to the organization’s place of business after the
organization is known to be represented by counsel.6 Investigations of intellectual
property rights violations can potentially involve management employees, especially
when the alleged infringer is a mom-and-pop operation or other small business.
Nevertheless, if an employee is selling products to the public at a store, warehouse or
over the phone, the employee’s rank should be of no moment in an analysis of the ex
parte contact.
Low-level employees, such as retail staff, are also within the ambit of Rule 4.2
because Comment 7 prohibits contacts with a constituent whose act or omission may be
imputed to the organization or whose statement may constitute an admission. Since it is
generally the goal of interlocutory investigations to reveal continued violations or to
3

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. (2002).
5
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002).
6
It should be said that challenges to such investigative evidence can also arise under Rule 4.1,
concerning misrepresentations to third parties. Rule 4.1 states: “In the course of representing a client a
lawyer shall not knowingly. . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person. . .” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002). Comment 1 to that rule states: “A lawyer is required to be
truthful when dealing with others on a client’s behalf. . . A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer
incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. . .” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. (2002). The practice of having individuals pose as consumers during
intellectual property disputes generally has been accepted as ethical and will not be discussed here. For a
discussion of the responsibilities of lawyers for deception by undercover investigators, see generally Darid
B. Isbell & Lucantonion N. Falvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover
Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791 (1995).
4
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ensure compliance with temporary relief, such investigations are almost exclusively
conducted with the purpose of seeking out evidentiary admissions. Violations of the
Rules can result in sanctions against the attorney involved and the inadmissibility of
evidence obtained through the use of investigators. So what is an ethical lawyer to do?
Although this conundrum has been addressed only rarely by the federal courts,
some insight can be gleaned from the available decisions.

II.
A.

THE CASE LAW

THE GIDATEX DECISION

In Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 7 the issue of contacting a represented
party arose by a motion in limine to exclude evidence obtained through conversations
between plaintiff’s investigators and defendant’s sales clerks. The defendants sought to
exclude the investigator’s testimony, reports and tape-recorded conversations as a
sanction for plaintiff’s purported violations of the anti-contact rule.8
¶10
The facts of this case are representative of typical investigations conducted during
trademark infringement litigation. Defendant Campaniello had been a licensed sales
agent of “Saporiti Italia” furniture. Plaintiff Gidatex, the manufacturer of the furniture,
had terminated Campaniello’s license, but Campaniello continued to sell the “Saporiti
Italia” furniture that it had in stock. Gidatex alleged that Campaniello lured customers to
its showrooms by displaying the “Saporiti Italia” trademark, then selling customers
furniture produced by other manufacturers. To prove this classic case of passing-off,
Gidatex’s counsel hired private investigators to pose as interior designers and tape record
conversations with Campaniello’s salespeople.9
¶11
The Gidatex court provided three reasons why defendants’ motion in limine to
exclude evidence should be denied: (1) the ethics rules were not applicable to the
situation; (2) plaintiff’s attorneys had not violated the ethics rules even if they were
applicable; and (3) exclusion of evidence was not the proper remedy for a violation of the
ethics rules.10
¶12
The court stated that the purpose of the anti-contact rule was to preserve the proper
functioning of the attorney-client relationship.11 Noting that the investigators did nothing
more than any ordinary consumer of the products would have done, the court found that
the sales clerks, as low level employees, would not have disclosed, or even have known,
¶9

7

82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Id. The court was construing the American Bar Association (“ABA”) and the New York State Bar
Association (“NYSBA”) Disciplinary Rule (“DR”) 7-104(A)(1), which states:
During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall not. . .communicate or cause
another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by a lawyer in that matter unless the lawyer has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.35 (2003). This rule is not significantly different from Rule
4.2 of the Model Rules.
9
Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 122 (citing N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l. Ethics Op. 607 (1990) at 1).
8
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any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.12 The court also noted that the
statements made by the clerks were no different than the statements they would have
made to actual, ordinary consumers.13
After examining the purpose of the anti-contact rule, the court explained that the
policies underlying trademark and unfair competition law made application of the anticontact rule in such contexts inappropriate, stating: “These ethical rules should not
govern situations where a party is legitimately investigating potential unfair business
practices by use of an undercover [agent] posing as a member of the general public
engaging in ordinary business transactions with the target.”14
The court noted that undercover investigators provide an effective enforcement
mechanism for detecting and proving unfair competition and, without them, such activity
might otherwise escape detection. The court approvingly cited cases where reliable
investigative testimony was found to be probative and admissible evidence in trademark
disputes.15 Thus, as the Gidatex court recognized, prohibiting undercover, interlocutory
investigations would undermine the policy goals of trademark and unfair competition law
while not furthering the goals of the attorney-client privilege, the preservation of which is
a purpose of the anti-contact rule.
The difficulty for attorneys facing a decision on whether to conduct an
investigation during the pendency of a lawsuit is underscored by the Gidatex court’s
decision that, assuming the ethics rules applied in such situations, plaintiff’s attorney
“technically” satisfied the three-part test used by the Second Circuit to determine whether
the disciplinary rules have been violated.16 Despite this technical violation, the court
nevertheless concluded that the “actions [of plaintiff’s counsel] simply do not represent
the type of conduct prohibited by the rules. The use of private investigators, posing as
consumers and speaking to nominal parties who are not involved in any aspect of the
litigation, does not constitute an end-run around the attorney client privilege.”17
Lastly, but not of least importance, was the court’s brief commentary that even if
the ethics rules had been violated, exclusion of evidence was not the proper remedy
because it would not serve the public interest or promote the goals of the disciplinary
rules.18

12

Id. at 126.
Id.
14
Id. at 122.
15
Id. at 124 (citing Nikon v. Ikon Corp., 803 F. Supp. 910, 921-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 987 F.2d 91,
95-96 (2d Cir. 1993); Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1186, 1188 (D.C.N.Y.
1984), aff’d, 765 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1985); Union Carbide v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 384 (7th Cir.
1976)).
16
Id. at 125-26. The Second Circuit’s test is as follows: (1) Did counsel communicate with a “party”?
(2) If so, did counsel know that the party was represented by a lawyer in this matter? (3) Did counsel
“cause” the communication to occur? See Miano v. AC&R Advert. Inc., 148 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
17
Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 126.
18
Id.
13
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¶17

¶18

¶19

¶20

¶21

THE BEATLES STAMPS

Similar to Gidatex, in Apple Corps Ltd., v. International Collectors Society, 19 the
defendants in a copyright infringement action previously resolved by a consent decree
filed a motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs brought a contempt
proceeding after a compliance investigation revealed that the defendants had not abided
by the consent decree.
The original action was brought by various owners, including Yoko Ono Lennon,
of the rights in the names, likenesses and trademarks of The Beatles, Paul McCartney and
John Lennon to stop the defendants’ sale of postage stamps bearing images of The
Beatles and Yoko Ono Lennon (“Beatles/Lennon stamps”).20 The parties resolved their
dispute by a Consent Order, which was entered by the court.
After plaintiffs’ counsel became aware of defendants’ possible violation of the
Consent Order, plaintiffs’ counsel conducted an investigation to determine whether the
defendants were in compliance. The court stated that the communications between
plaintiff’s investigators and defendants’ sales representatives “were limited to listening to
recommendations about which stamps to purchase and accepting an order for Sell-Off
stamps.”21 The plaintiffs’ investigators did not ask sales representatives any questions
about instructions given or received, or about the defendants’ practices or policies, with
regard to the Beatles/Lennon stamps. The investigation revealed that the defendants were
not in compliance with the Consent Order, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for
contempt.22 The defendants then moved for dissolution of the Consent Order and for
sanctions pursuant to Rule 4.2, among others.23
The court found plaintiffs’ investigative activities were not prohibited by New
Jersey’s rules of ethics. New Jersey law only provides protection from contact for “an
organization’s litigation control group.”24 In New Jersey, the litigation control group is
defined as those persons in an organization who are “current agents and employees
responsible for or significantly involved in the determination of the organization’s legal
position in the matter. . .”25 Given the New Jersey rule, the court had no trouble finding
that the defendants’ sales clerks did not fall within the litigation control group and,
therefore, the ex parte contacts were permitted.26 The court did note, though, that such ex
parte contacts would have to be conducted in accordance with Rule 4.3, which deals with
contacts on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel.27
The court explained the policies underlying the anti-contact rule: “to prevent
situations in which a represented party may be taken advantage of by adverse counsel,”28
19

15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1998).
Id.
21
Id. at 474.
22
Id. at 462-66.
23
Id. at 472.
24
Id. at 473 (citing N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2).
25
Id. (citing N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13). The court expressly noted that New Jersey’s
version of the anti-contact rule explicitly excluded persons whose actions bind the organization or are
imputable to the organization unless they meet the “legal position” test. Apple Corps, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 474
(citing Report of the Special Supreme Court Comm. on RPC 4.2, 139 N.J. L.J. 1161, 14 (1995)).
26
Id. at 474.
27
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2002).
28
Id. (citing Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (1990)).
20
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and “to avoid ‘artful’ legal questioning.”29 The court also opined, “it is not the purpose of
[the anti-contact rule] to protect a corporate party from the revelation of prejudicial
facts.”30
¶22
The court also turned its attention to misrepresentations made during the
investigation. Such misrepresentations were only in regard to identity and purpose for
calling.31 Thus, the court stated:
RPC 4.2 cannot apply where lawyers and/or their investigators, seeking to
learn about current corporate misconduct, act as member[s] of the general
public to engage in ordinary business transactions with low-level
employees of a represented corporation. To apply the rule to the
investigation which took place here would serve merely to immunize
corporations from liability for unlawful activity, while not effectuating any
of the purposes behind the rule.32
C.

EVIDENTIARY SANCTIONS FOR RULES OF ETHICS VIOLATIONS

¶23

In Midwest Motor Sports, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., the court granted sanctions
against the defendant because defendant’s counsel violated South Dakota’s Rules of
Professional Conduct by using an investigator to record conversations with the plaintiff’s
sales representatives and, thereby, attempted to obtain evidence and elicit admissions. 33
Specifically, the court excluded all evidence obtained from the surreptitious investigation,
including recordings of the investigator’s conversations with the plaintiff’s sales clerks,
the investigator’s testimony, and any other evidence obtained by the defense as a result of
the recorded conversations.34 Although this decision appears to be contrary to both
Gidatex and Apple Corps in substance and outcome, a careful review of the facts reveals
that the court was properly concerned about the scope of the investigation. Nevertheless,
while Midwest Motor Sports is capable of interpretation within the paradigm of Gidatex
and Apple Corps, the decision serves as a warning to counsel not to overreach in
conducting investigations of represented parties.
¶24
Midwest Motor Sports involved a dispute concerning the discontinuance of the sale
of a certain snowmobile line at the plaintiff’s store. Here, the Defendant’s investigator
posed as a customer and recorded his conversations with “Bill,” one of plaintiff’s
29

Id. (citing Weider Sports Equip. Co., Ltd. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502 (D. Utah 1996)).
Id. (citing Weider, 912 F. Supp. at 510); see also Johnson v. Cadillac Plastic Group, Inc., 930 F.
Supp. 1437 (D. Colo. 1996) (holding Rule 4.2 is a rule of ethics rather than a rule of corporate immunity
and an expansive reading would curtail the truth-seeking function of the courts).
31
Id.
32
Id. at 474-75 (citing Weider 912 F. Supp. 502). The court also analyzed the propriety of using
misrepresentation under New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c), which prohibits conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Here, the court, citing Bruce A. Green, the cochair of the ABA Litigation Section’s Committee on Ethics and Professionalism, stated that: “The
prevailing understanding in the legal profession is that a public or private lawyer’s use of an undercover
investigator to detect ongoing violations of the law is not ethically proscribed, especially where it would be
difficult to discover the violations by other means.” Apple Corps, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
33
It is not illegal in South Dakota for one party to record a conversation without the other party’s
knowledge or consent. 144 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1158 (D.S.D. 2001) (citing State v. Braddock, 452 N.W.2d
785, 788 (S.D. 1990)).
34
Midwest Motor Sports, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
30
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salesmen, during two separate visits to plaintiff’s store, as well as a conversation with
another snowmobile salesman at another party’s store.35 Of particular importance to the
court’s decision here were admissions by the investigator during his deposition that the
purpose of his visits to plaintiff’s store was to elicit evidence in the case and obtain
information that went far beyond anything a typical consumer would be given during an
ordinary transaction or inquiry.
¶25
In describing the purpose of his visits, the investigator stated that the defendant’s
attorneys had hired him, in part, to visit a showroom, to talk to a salesman about
products, to find out which snowmobiles were being recommended, and to look at the
equipment.36 The investigator further believed that he was visiting the plaintiff’s store in
order to determine “what was selling best” and “whether [defendants] were hurt because
Arctic Cat wasn’t being sold there any longer.”37 His understanding of why he recorded
his conversation with the salesman at the other party’s store was, in part, to see if the
salesman would say anything about the lawsuit.38 In addition, the investigator stated that
he was instructed to “get into financing, promotions, and close-out pricing” with the sales
people at plaintiff’s store and “have the sales person relate. . .the situation on all the
snowmobiles.”39 At the end of his deposition, the investigator responded affirmatively to
the question of whether the purpose of his visits was to elicit evidence in the case on
behalf of defendant’s attorneys rather than to reveal evidence regarding sales clerk’s
representations to typical consumers of snowmobiles.40
¶26
The court’s analysis of the anti-contact rule began with an explanation of its
purposes. The four purposes of Rule 4.2 are: (1) to prevent attorneys from circumventing
opposing counsel in order to obtain statements from adverse parties; (2) to protect the
integrity of the attorney-client relationship; (3) to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of
privileged information; and (4) to facilitate settlement by channeling disputes through
attorneys.41
¶27
The court rejected the notion that all employees of an organization are protected by
Rule 4.2, stating that such automatic representation would impede investigation and place
too much power in the employer to control ex parte contacts.42 It then went on to adopt
the holding in Cole v. Appalachian Power Co.,43 that an attorney may not conduct ex
parte interviews with five classes of an organization’s current employees under Rule 4.2,
unless counsel has the consent of the opposing attorney or is otherwise authorized by law.
These classes include “current. . .employees whose act or omission in connection with the
matter may be imputed to the corporation or organization for purposes of civil or criminal
liability,” and “agent[s] or servant[s] of the corporation or organization whose statement
35

Id. at 1151-52.
Id. at 1150.
37
Id. at 1150-51.
38
Id. at 1151. The sales person to whom the investigator spoke at the other store happened to be the
owner of the store and was already represented by counsel in the lawsuit because he was a non-party
witness. The fact that he was the owner, and thus a management level employee, did not seem to make a
difference in the court’s decision.
39
Id. at 1151.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 1154 (citing Guillen v. City of Chicago, 956 F. Supp. 1416, 1427 (N.D. Ill. 1997)).
42
Id.
43
903 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.W.Va. 1995).
36
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concerns a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, which statement was
made during the existence of the relationship and which is offered against the corporation
or organization as an admission.”44 Significantly, the court also pointed out that Rule 4.3
would prevent an investigator from misrepresenting his identity to a person not
represented by counsel.45 Finally, the court distinguished cases such as Apple Corps
where the state law in question only prohibited contacts with a “litigation control
group.”46
¶28
After resolving the issue of what contacts were and were not prohibited by South
Dakota’s rules of ethics, the court announced that sanctions were not to be had under this
arguably new interpretation of Rule 4.2 from the contacts with Bill the salesman.
Instead, the court found that sanctions were proper under Rule 4.3 because the interviews
took place under false pretenses.47 The court also awarded sanctions, under Rule 4.2, for
contact that the investigator had with the president of another corporation, who was
represented by counsel in another suit with the defendant. That contact involved the
investigator posing as a potential customer of snowmobiles and, by coincidence, he spoke
with the president of the corporation at the corporation’s store.48
¶29
The court further admonished prospective litigants, “[i]f counsel practicing before
this Court commit similar ethical violations in the future, however, the sanctions imposed
will not be so lenient.”49
D.
¶30

A CONTINUUM OF CONDUCT

Although not in the context of intellectual property litigation, in Hill v. Shell Oil
Co., the court’s analysis of the three aforementioned decisions suggested that there was a
continuum of conduct from permissible to impermissible.50 In Hill, the plaintiffs
conducted undercover investigations of gas station attendants, including videotaping, to
document discriminatory practice.51 The defendants moved for a protective order

44
Midwest Motor Sports, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-57. The court placed emphasis on the fact that Rule
4.2 must be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), which is an exception to the
hearsay rule that provides for the admissibility of statements by an agent or servant of a party offered
against that party.
45
Id. at 1157 (citing Cole, 903 F. Supp. at 980) (“The attorney or investigator shall: (1) fully disclose
his or her representative capacity to the employee, (2) state the reason for seeking the interview as it
concerns the attorney’s client and the employer, and (3) inform the individual of his or her right to refuse to
be interviewed”).
46
Id. at 1157.
47
Id. at 1158; see also In Re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000) (reviewing disciplinary proceeding and
rejecting proposed investigatory exception to the rule against misrepresentation–imposing sanction of
public reprimand on attorney who made false statements during investigation prior to commencement of
action). In 2002, the Oregon Supreme Court amended its disciplinary rule to allow a lawyer to advise and
to supervise otherwise lawful undercover investigations of violations of civil law, criminal law, or
constitutional rights if the lawyer “in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful
activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future.” See OR. CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1-102(D) (2003).
48
Midwest Motor Sports, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
49
Id. at 1160.
50
209 F. Supp. 2d 876, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
51
Id.
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prohibiting future investigative videotaping because such investigations violated
Northern District of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2 and/or 4.3.52
¶31
The court first determined that Rule 4.3 did not apply to this case because the
employees were represented parties. It reasoned that the employees’ allegedly
discriminatory conduct could be attributable to the defendant employer and that the
employees’ statements potentially could be used as admissions against the defendant
employer. Specifically, the court in Hill stated that the “scope of employee statements
that constitute employer admissions is provided in Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(D),” which comports with the understanding of the District of South Dakota.53
Thus, the employees were covered by Rule 4.2 as represented parties under the comments
to the Rule.54
¶32
In attempting to balance the decisions in Midwest Motor Sports and Gidatex, the
court found the following spectrum of conduct:
Lawyers (and investigators) cannot trick protected employees into doing
things or saying things they otherwise would not do or say. They probably
can employ persons to play the role of customers seeking services on the
same basis as the general public. They can videotape protected employees
going about their activities in what those employees believe is the normal
course.55
¶33

Therefore, the court found that videotape recordings of employees reacting to
persons posing as consumers were properly obtained under Rule 4.2. Nevertheless, the
court reserved until trial the admissibility determination of the substantive conversations,
held outside of normal business transactions, between the defendant’s employees and the
plaintiff’s investigative agents.56
III. ABA OPINION 396

¶34

In 1995, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) issued Formal Opinion 95-396
(“Opinion 396”) on the meaning of Rule 4.2.57 Opinion 396 reveals two important
aspects of interlocutory investigations: first, the timing of Rule 4.2’s attachment to

52

Id. (citing N. DIST. OF ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 and R. 4.3 (2002)).
Hill, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 879.
54
Id. at 878-79. The court noted that the comment to Rule 4.2 stated that for purposes of the rule’s
prohibition employees that are considered represented include: employees who have managerial
responsibility on behalf of the organization; employees whose acts or omissions in the matter can be
imputed to the organization; and employees whose admissions would be binding on the organization. Hill,
209 F. Supp. 2d at 878 (citing Orlowski v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 723, 728 (N.D. Ill.
1996); Weibrecht v. Southern Illinois Transfer, Inc., 241 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2001)). The court distinguished
Apple Corps, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998). New Jersey law only provided protection for members of
the litigation group.
55
Hill, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 880.
56
Id.
57
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995). Opinion 396 was given as
a result of the controversy over the Department of Justice’s regulations on communications with
represented parties. See id. at n.1.
53

55
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communications between an attorney and a represented party, and second, whether all
employees of an organization are covered by Rule 4.2’s prohibition once it does attach.
Opinion 396 makes clear that the application of the Rule does not depend
on a proceeding having actually commenced. . .The interests that the Rule
seeks to protect are engaged when litigation is simply under consideration,
even though it has not actually been instituted, and the persons who are
potentially parties to the litigation have retained counsel with respect to
the matter in dispute.58
¶35

Therefore, the moment an attorney knows the party sought to be contacted is
represented in the matter, whether as a potential adversary, witness or simply to protect
its interests in the matter, Rule 4.2 attaches. For example, if an attorney is investigating
an organization for potential action, it can do so without concern for the strictures of Rule
4.2, even if that organization has general counsel. But after a cease and desist letter is
sent or other contact is made, if the organization directs the matter to its general counsel,
then Rule 4.2 now applies to subsequent contacts.
¶36
Opinion 396 also makes clear that representation of an organization does not bar
communications with all employees of that organization. The ABA first looked to the
Model Code to establish the central proposition upon which Rule 4.2 rests: that the legal
system functions best when persons in need of legal assistance are represented by their
own counsel.59 Thus,
the anti-contact rules provide protection of the represented person against
overreaching by the adverse counsel, safeguard the client-lawyer
relationship from interference by adverse counsel, and reduce the
likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that
might harm their interests.60
¶37

The ABA likewise made clear that “the term represented party refers not only to
those with managerial responsibilities but to anyone who may legally bind the
organization with respect to the matter in question.”61 Moreover, “[i]f an employee
cannot by statement, act or omission bind the organization with respect to the particular
matter, then that employee may ethically be contacted by opposing counsel. . .”62 The
latter interpretation by the ABA was made in the context of an illustration explaining that
even if in-house counsel declares that none of the employees of in-house counsel’s
organization may be contacted without in-house counsel’s permission, a lawyer would
not be barred from making contact with those employees whose statements, acts or
omissions could not bind the organization with respect to the matter at issue.63
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ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995) (emphasis in original).
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Id. (citing Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The
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Opinion 396 does state that otherwise impermissible contacts made through investigators are
misconduct under Model Rule 8.4(a).
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¶38

Use of the word “bind” by the ABA in this context is particularly instructive. Bind
means “to obligate or to bring under definite duties or legal obligations.”64 Opinion 396,
though, does not purport to place any import to its use of the term. In fact, Opinion 396
explains that anyone who can legally bind the organization includes those persons who
are already covered by the Comments, i.e., those whose statements may be imputed to or
used as admissions against the organization.65
¶39
Therefore, Opinion 396 puts the question of acceptable contact squarely on the
meanings of the terms “imputed” and “admission” as they are used in the Comments to
Rule 4.2. An admission, in this context, is a statement offered against a party made by
the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment.66 It is clear under Opinion 396, without even looking at the meaning of the
term “imputed,” that contact with low-level employees through investigations of
allegedly infringing conduct during the course of litigation is within the prohibition of
Rule 4.2.
IV. GUIDANCE FROM THE LAW
¶40

The reasoning embodied in the Hill, Apple Corps and Gidatex decisions is sound as
to both the purposes and the application of the ethics rules. The purposes of the anticontact rule are not in doubt. An attorney must not seek an advantage for his client by
circumventing opposing counsel and communicating directly with the adverse party.
¶41
The revelation of an infringer’s customary business practice is not such an
advantage. The infringer directs his business to consumers of his products. Therefore, an
attorney merely places his client on equal footing with the general public when he
conducts an undercover investigation that is strictly directed to the infringer’s conduct in
relation to consumers. Thus, the only potential disadvantage an infringer suffers by
directing his activities to an investigator rather than a true customer is, at most, the lost
time and money if the investigator fails to make a purchase.67 There is no sound basis for
a rule of law that affords less information to litigants than to the typical consumer.
¶42
An attorney who uses a private investigator posing as a consumer or customer is
not attempting to circumvent opposing counsel but rather is trying to unearth illegal
activity. The purpose of the rule is not “to protect a corporate party from the revelation
of prejudicial facts.”68 Evidence of such activity would otherwise be very difficult to
obtain. Even advocates of a blanket prohibition on contact with represented parties allow
for exceptions when the policies underlying certain laws would be thwarted by the literal
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interpretation of the anti-contact rule.69 The policies underlying intellectual property
infringement actions are likewise undermined by literal application of the anti-contact
rule.
The lesson from Midwest Motor Sports is that if an investigator is sent to an
¶43
infringer’s place of business, he should understand that his sole purpose is to behave as
an ordinary consumer and not actively attempt to seek admissions. In Midwest Motor
Sports, the investigator was asked in his deposition, “. . .the purpose of these trips wasn’t
to be a consumer shopping for a snowmobile, it was to attempt to elicit evidence in a
pending civil case on behalf of the lawyers that hired you, correct?” The investigator
answered “yes.”70 As stated in Hill, the investigator can seek services on the same basis
as the general public, but cannot trick protected employees into doing or saying things
they otherwise would not do or say.71 Investigators must know that their goal is to reveal
evidence of the ordinary consumer’s experience and not to gather evidence above and
beyond that goal.
For the more cautious attorney, perhaps the safest course is to seek, ex parte, leave
¶44
of court to conduct an investigation of an infringer’s continuing violations.72 While this
method may be more time consuming and not have the flexibility of simply asking an
investigator to run over to the store and see what the salespeople have to say, it provides
much more in the way of assurance to the attorney involved that the court will not level
sanctions against him.
V.
¶45

CONCLUSION

The ethical dilemma encountered by intellectual property litigants in conducting
investigations of represented parties is no dilemma at all if counsel is clear about the
purpose and conduct of the investigators’ visit. It is important that the investigator know
his role and that he do only those things that an ordinary consumer would do under
similar circumstances. If counsel is concerned with a particular jurisdiction’s rules of
ethics, the safest course is to seek leave to conduct the investigations ex parte from the
Judge—at the very least in South Dakota.
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See David A. Green, Balancing Ethical Concerns Against Liberal Discovery: The Case Of Rule 4.2
And The Problem of Loophole Lawyering, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 283 (1995) (allowing for exception in
cases involving discrimination allegations and government investigation of wrongdoing).
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Midwest Motor Sports, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. The court noted that the investigator in this case
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209 F. Supp. 2d at 877.
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See, e.g., Flebotte v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., No. 97-30117-FHF, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21327 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. June 28, 2001).
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